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Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Baba Kamma
But where the cow is not available, quarter damages will be paid out of the body of the calf.1 Now this is so only where it is not known whether the calf was still part of the cow at the time she gored or whether it was not so, but were we certain that the calf was still part of the cow at the time of the goring2 the whole payment of the half damages would be made from the body of the calf. Raba here adopts the same line of reasoning [as in another place], as Raba has indeed stated: Where a cow has done damage, payment can be collected out of the body of its calf, the reason being that the latter is a part of the body of the former, whereas in the case of a chicken doing damage, no payment will be made out of its eggs, the reason being that they are a separate [body].3
Raba further said: [Where an ox has gored a cow and caused miscarriage] the valuation will not be made for the cow separately and for the calf separately, but the valuation will be made for the calf as at the time when it formed a part of the cow; for if you do not adopt this rule,4 you will be found to be making the defendant suffer unduly. The same method is followed in the case of the cutting off the hand of a neighbour's slave;5 and the same method is followed in the case of damage done to a neighbour's field.6 Said R. Aha the son of Raba to R. Ashi: If justice demands, why should not the defendant suffer? — Because he is entitled to say to him: 'Since it was a pregnant cow that I deprived you of, it is a pregnant cow which should be taken into valuation.'
There is no question that where the cow belonged to one owner and the calf to another owner, the value of the fat condition of the cow will go to the owner of the cow.7 But what of the value of its bulky appearance? — R. Papa said: It will go to the owner of the cow. R. Aha the son of R. Ika said: It will be shared [by the two owners].8 The law is that it will be shared [by the two owners].
MISHNAH.IF A POTTER BRINGS HIS WARES INTO THE COURTYARD OF ANOTHER PERSON WITHOUT PERMISSION, AND THE CATTLE OF THE OWNER OF THE COURTYARD BREAKS THEM, THERE IS NO LIABILITY.9 MOREOVER, SHOULD THE ANIMAL BE INJURED BY THEM, THE OWNER OF THE POTTERY IS LIABLE [TO PAY DAMAGES]. IF, HOWEVER, HE BROUGHT [THEM] IN WITH PERMISSION,10 THE OWNER OF THE COURTYARD IS LIABLE. SIMILARLY IF [A MAN] BRINGS HIS PRODUCE INTO THE COURTYARD OF ANOTHER PERSON WITHOUT PERMISSION AND THE ANIMAL OF THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES CONSUMES IT, THERE IS NO LIABILITY.11 IF IT WAS HARMED BY IT THE OWNER WOULD BE LIABLE. IF, HOWEVER, HE BROUGHT THEM IN WITH PERMISSION,10 THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES WOULD BE LIABLE. SO ALSO IF [A MAN] BRINGS HIS OX INTO THE COURTYARD OF ANOTHER WITHOUT
Baba Kamma 47b
PERMISSION AND THE OX OF THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES GORES IT OR THE DOG OF THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES BITES IT, THERE IS NO LIABILITY. MOREOVER SHOULD IT GORE THE OX OF THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES ITS OWNER WOULD BE LIABLE. AGAIN, IF IT FALLS [THERE] INTO A PIT OF THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES AND MAKES THE WATER IN IT FOUL, THERE WOULD BE LIABILITY. SO ALSO IF [IT KILLS] THE OWNER'S FATHER OR SON [WHO] WAS INSIDE THE PIT, THERE WOULD BE LIABILITY TO PAY KOFER.1 IF, HOWEVER, HE BROUGHT IT IN WITH PERMISSION, THE OWNER OF THE YARD WOULD BE LIABLE. RABBI, HOWEVER, SAYS: IN ALL THESE CASES THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES WOULD NOT BE LIABLE UNLESS HE HAS TAKEN IT UPON HIMSELF TO WATCH [THE ARTICLES BROUGHT INTO HIS PREMISES].
GEMARA. The reason why [the potter would be liable for damage occasioned by his pottery to the cattle of the owner of the premises] is because the entry was without permission, which shows that were it with permission the owner of the pots would not be liable for the damage done to the cattle of the owner of the premises and we do not say that the owner of the pots has by implication undertaken to watch the cattle of the owner of the premises. Who is the authority for this view? — Rabbi, who has laid down that without express stipulation no duty to watch is undertaken.2 Now look at the second clause: IF HE BROUGHT THEM IN WITH PERMISSION, THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES WOULD BE LIABLE. This brings us round to the view of the Rabbis,3 who said that even without express stipulation he makes himself responsible for watching. Moreover, [it was further stated]: RABBI SAYS: IN ALL THESE CASES THE OWNER OF THE PREMISES WOULD NOT BE LIABLE UNLESS HE HAS TAKEN UPON HIMSELF TO WATCH. [Are we to say that] the opening clause and the concluding clause are in accordance with Rabbi while the middle clause is in accordance with the Rabbis? — R. Zera thereupon said: The contradiction [is obvious]; he who taught one clause cannot have taught the other clause. Raba, however, said; The whole [of the anonymous part of the Mishnah] is in accordance with the Rabbis, for [where the entry was] with permission the owner of the premises undertook the safeguarding of the pots even against breakage by the wind.4
IF [A MAN] BRINGS HIS PRODUCE INTO THE COURTYARD OF ANOTHER OWNER etc. Rab said: This rule5 applies only where the animal [was injured] by slipping on them, but if the animal ate them [and was thereby harmed], there would be exemption on the ground that it should not have eaten them.6 Said R. Shesheth: I feel inclined to say that it was only when he was drowsy or asleep that Rab could have made such a statement.7 For it was taught: If one places deadly poison before the animal of another he is exempt from the judgment of Man, but liable to the judgment of Heaven.8 Now, that is so only in the case of deadly poison which is not usually consumed by an animal, but in the case of products that are usually consumed by an animal, there appears to be liability even to the judgment of Man. But why should this be so? [Why not argue:] It should not have eaten them? — I may reply that strictly speaking even in the case of produce there should be exemption from the judgment of Man, and there was a special purpose in enunciating this ruling with reference to deadly poison, namely that even where the article was one not usually consumed by an animal, there will still be liability to the judgment of Heaven. Or if you wish you may say that by the deadly poison mentioned was meant hypericum,9 which like a fruit [is eaten by animals].
An objection could be raised [from the following]: If a woman enters the premises of another person to grind wheat without permission, and the animal of the owner consumes it, there is no liability; if the animal is harmed, the woman would be liable. Now, why not argue: It should not have over-eaten? — I can answer: [In what respect] does this case go beyond that of the Mishnah, which was interpreted [to refer to damage occasioned by] the animal having slipped over them? What then was in the mind of the one who made the objection? — He might have said to you; Your explanation is satisfactory regarding the Mishnah where it says, IF IT WAS HARMED BY IT [which admits of being interpreted] that the animal slipped over them. But here [in the Baraitha] it says, 'if the animal is harmed', without the words 'by them', so that surely the consumption [of the wheat] is what is referred to. And the other?10 — He can contend [that the omission of these words] makes no difference.
Come and hear: If a man brought his ox into the courtyard of another person without permission, and it ate there wheat and got diarrhoea from which it died, there would be no liability. But if he brought it in with permission, the owner of the courtyard would be liable. Now why not argue: It should not have eaten?11 — Raba thereupon said: How can you raise an objection from a case where permission was given12 against a case where permission was not given?13 Where permission was given, the owner of the premises assumed liability for safeguarding the ox even against its strangling itself.
The question was raised: Where the owner of the premises has assumed responsibility to safeguard [the articles brought in to his premises], what is the legal position? Has the obligation to safeguard been assumed by him [only] against damage from his own [beasts], or has he perhaps also undertaken to safeguard from damage in general? Come and hear: Rab Judah b. Simon learnt in the [Tractate] Nezikin of the School of Karna;14 If a man brings his produce into the courtyard of another without permission, and an ox from elsewhere comes and consumes it, there is no liability. But if he brought it in with permission there would be liability. Now, who would be exempt15 and who would be liable?16 Does it not mean that the owner of the premises would be exempt15 and16 the owner of the premises would be liable?17 — I may say that this is not so, it is the owner of the ox who would be exempt15 and the owner of the ox who would be liable.16 But if it refers to the owner of the ox,
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