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Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Kethuboth
R. Eliezer b. Jacob interpreted: [The expressions] She'erah kesutha,1 [imply]: Provide her with raiment according to her age, viz. that a man shall not provide his old wife2 [with the raiment] of a young one nor his young wife with that of an old one. [The expressions], Kesutha we- 'Onatha3 [imply.] Provide her with raiment according to the season of the year,4 viz. that he shall not give her new raiment5 in the summer nor worn out raiment6 in the winter.7 R. Joseph learnt: Her flesh8 implies close bodily contact,9 viz, that he must not treat her in the manner of the Persians who perform their conjugal duties in their clothes. This provides support for [a ruling of] R. Huna who laid down that a husband who said, 'I will not [perform conjugal duties] unless she wears her clothes and I mine', must divorce her and give her also her kethubah.
R. JUDAH RULED: EVEN THE POOREST MAN IN ISRAEL etc. This10 then implies that the first Tanna is of the opinion that these11 are not [necessary]. But how is one to imagine [the case]? If these11 were required by the woman's status,12 what [it may be objected could be] the reason of the first Tanna who ruled [that these11 were] not [required]? And if these11 were not required by the woman's status,13 what [it may be objected could be] the reason of R. Judah? — [The ruling was] necessary only [in a case], for instance, where these were demanded by his status but not by hers. The first Tanna is of the opinion that the principle that she14 rises with him15 but does not go down with him16 is applied only during her lifetime17 but not after her death, while R. Judah maintains [that the principle applies] even after her death. R. Hisda laid down in the name of Mar 'Ukba that the halachah is in agreement with R. Judah.
R. Hisda further stated in the name of Mar 'Ukba: If a man became insane Beth din take possession18 of his estate and provide food and clothing for his wife, sons and daughters, and for anything else.19 Said Rabina to R. Ashi: Why should this20 be different from that concerning which it was taught: If a man went to a country beyond the sea and his wife claimed maintenance, Beth din take possession of21 his estate and provide food and clothing for his wife, but not for his sons and daughters or for anything else?22 The other replied: Do you not draw a distinction between one who departs23 deliberately and one who departs24 without knowing it?25
What [is meant by] 'anything else'? — R. Hisda replied: Cosmetics were meant,26 R. Joseph explained: Charity. According to him who replied, 'Cosmetics', the ruling27 would apply with even greater force to charity.28 He, however, who explained, 'charity' [restricts his ruling27 to this alone] but cosmetics [he maintains] must he given to her, for [her husband] would not be pleased that she shall lose her comeliness.
R. Hiyya b. Abin stated in the name of R. Huna: If a man went to a country beyond the sea, and his wife died, Beth din take possession29 of his estate and bury her in a manner befitting the dignity of his status. [You say] 'In a manner befitting the dignity of his status', and not that of her status!30 — Read, In a manner befitting his status also; and it is this that he31 informs us: She rises with him [in his dignity] but does not go down with him [to a lower status] even after her death.
R. Mattena ruled: A man32 who gave instructions that when [his wife] died she shall not be buried at the expense of his estate must be obeyed.33 What, however, is the reason [for obeying the man] when he has left instructions? Obviously because the estate falls to the orphans;34 but the estate falls to the orphans, does it not, even if he left no instructions?35 — [The proper reading], however, is: A man32 who gave instructions that when he dies be shall not be buried at the expense of his estate36 is not to be obeyed, for it is not within his power37 to enrich his sons and throw himself upon the public.
UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HER HUSBAND1 [BY GOING INTO THE BRIDAL CHAMBER]2 AT MARRIAGE. IF HER FATHER DELIVERED HER TO THE AGENTS OF THE HUSBAND3 SHE PASSES4 UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HER HUSBAND. IF HER FATHER WENT WITH HER HUSBAND'S AGENTS5 OR IF THE FATHER'S AGENTS WENT WITH THE HUSBAND'S AGENTS5 SHE REMAINS4 UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HER FATHER. IF HER FATHER'S AGENTS DELIVERED HER TO HER HUSBAND'S AGENTS6 SHE PASSES4 UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HER HUSBAND.
GEMARA. What [is the purport of] REMAINS?7 — To exclude [the ruling] of an earlier8 Mishnah where we learned: If the respective periods9 expired10 and they were not married11 they are entitled to maintenance out of the man's estate12 and [if he is a priest]13 may also eat terumah.14 Therefore 'REMAINS'15 was used.16
IF HER FATHER DELIVERED HER TO THE AGENTS OF THE HUSBAND SHE PASSES UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF HER HUSBAND etc. Rab ruled: Her delivery [is regarded as entry into the bridal chamber] in all respects17 except that of terumah;18 but R. Assi ruled in respect of terumah also.
R. Huna, (or as some Say, Hiyya b. Rab,) raised an objection against R. Assi: She remains15 under the authority of her father until she enters the bridal chamber.19 'Did I not tell you', said Rab to them,20 'that you should not be guided by an ambiguous statement?21 He22 can answer you that "her delivery" is regarded as her entry into the bridal chamber'.
Samuel, however, ruled: [Her delivery has the force of entry into the bridal chamber only in respect] of her inheritance.23 Resh Lakish ruled: [Only in respect] of her kethubah.24 What is meant by 'her kethubah'? [If it means] that should [the woman] die he inherits it,25 [then this ruling is, is it not,] the same as that of Samuel?26 Rabina replied: The meaning is27 that her [statutory] kethubah from a second husband28 is only a maneh.29
Both R. Johanan and R. Hanina ruled: Her delivery [is regarded as entry into the bridal chamber] in all respects. even that of terumah.30
An objection was raised: If the father went with the agents of the husband, or if the agents of the father went with the agents of the husband, or if she had a court-yard on the way, and she entered it with him31 to rest there for the night,32 her father inherits from her if she died, although her kethubah33 is already in the house of her husband. If, however, her father delivered her to her husband's agents, or if her father's agents delivered her to her husband's agents, or he34 had a court-yard on the way, and she entered it with him with an intention to matrimony, her husband is her heir if she died, although her kethubah33 was still in her father's house.35 This ruling36 applies only in respect of her inheritance37 but in respect of terumah [the law is that] no woman is allowed to eat terumah until she enters the bridal chamber.38 [Does not this represent] a refutation of all?39 This is indeed a refutation.
[But] is not this,40 however, self-contradictory? You said. 'She entered it with him to rest for the night'. The reason [why such an act is not regarded as entry into the bridal chamber is] because [the entrance was made specifically for the purpose of] resting for the night. Had it, however, been made with no specified intention [it would be deemed to have been made] with an intention to matrimony. Read, however, the final clause: 'She entered it with him with an intention to matrimony', from which it follows, does it not, that if the entrance was made with no specified intention [it would be deemed to have been made just] in order to rest there for the night? — R. Ashi replied: Both entrances mentioned41 are such as were made with no specified intention, but any unspecified [entrance into] a court-yard of hers [is presumed to have been made] in order to rest there for the night while any unspecified [entrance into] a court-yard of his42 [is presumed to have been made] with an intention to matrimony.
A Tanna taught: If a father delivered [his daughter]43 to the agents of her husband and she played the harlot44 her penalty is that45 of strangulation.46 Whence is this ruling deduced? — R. Ammi b. Hama replied: Scripture stated,47 To play the harlot in her father's house,48 thus excluding one whom the father had delivered to the agents of the husband.
Might it not be suggested that this48 excludes one who entered her bridal chamber but with whom no cohabitation had taken place?49 — Raba replied: Ammi told me [that a woman50 who entered her] bridal chamber was explicitly51 mentioned in Scripture: If there be a damsel that is a virgin betrothed unto a man;52 'a damsel' but not a woman who is adolescent, 'a virgin' 'but not a woman with whom intercourse took place, 'betrathed' but not one married.53 Now what [is meant by] 'one married'? If it be suggested: One actually married, [it can be objected that such a deduction]54 would be practically the same as that of 'a virgin but not one with whom intercourse took place'. Consequently it must be concluded55 [that by 'married' was meant one] who entered into the bridal chamber but with whom no intercourse took place.56
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