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Babylonian Talmud: Tractate Shabbath
the one refers to large ones, the other to small ones.1
R. Assi said, They [the Tannaim] learnt. As for an earthen vessel, its standard is [a hole] large enough to admit a liquid, while [one merely] sufficient to allow a liquid to run out was mentioned only in connection with a mutilated vessel.2 What is the reason? — Said Mar Zutra son of R. Nahman: Because people do not say, 'Let us bring one fragment for another.'3
'Ulla said, Two amoraim in Palestine differ on this matter, [viz.,] R. Jose son of R. Abin and R. Jose son of Zabda: One maintains: [the standard is a hole] large enough to allow a pomegranate to fall out; while the other rules: As large as a small root.4 And your sign is, 'whether one increases or whether one diminishes.5
R. Hinena b. Kahana said in R. Eliezer's name: As for an earthen vessel, its standard is [a hole] large enough to allow olives to fall out;6 and Mar Kashisha son of Rabbah completes [this statement] in R. Eliezer's name: And then they rank as vessels of dung, stone, or clay,7 which do not contract uncleanness either by Biblical or by Rabbinical law;8 but in respect to [the law of] a tight. fitting lid [it ranks as a vessel] unless the greater portion thereof is broken through.9
MISHNAH. IF ONE THROWS [AN ARTICLE] FROM PRIVATE INTO PUBLIC GROUND [OR] FROM PUBLIC INTO PRIVATE GROUND, HE IS CULPABLE. FROM ONE PRIVATE DOMAIN TO ANOTHER, AND PUBLIC GROUND LIES BETWEEN, R. AKIBA HOLDS HIM LIABLE, BUT THE SAGES DECLARE HIM EXEMPT. HOW SO?10 IF THERE ARE TWO BALCONIES FACING EACH OTHER IN THE STREET, HE WHO REACHES OVER OR THROWS [AN ARTICLE] FROM ONE TO THE OTHER IS NOT CULPABLE. IF BOTH ARE ON THE SAME STOREY,11 HE WHO REACHES OVER IS CULPABLE, WHILE HE WHO THROWS IS NOT, FOR THUS WAS THE SERVICE OF THE LEVITES:12 TWO WAGGONS [STOOD] BEHIND EACH OTHER IN PUBLIC GROUND, [AND] THEY REACHED OVER THE BOARDS FROM ONE TO ANOTHER, BUT DID NOT THROW.
GEMARA. Consider: throwing is a derivative of carrying out:1 where is carrying out itself written? — Said R. Johanan, Scripture saith, And Moses gave commandment, and they caused a proclamation to pass throughout the camp, [etc.]:2 now, where was Moses stationed? in the camp of the Levites, which was public ground,3 and he said to the Israelites, Do not carry out and fetch from your private dwellings into public ground. But how do you know that this was on the Sabbath: perhaps this happened4 during the week, the reason being that the material was complete[ly adequate], as it is written, For the stuff they had was sufficient, etc.5 — The meaning of 'passing through' is learnt from [its employment in connection with] the Day of Atonement, Here it is written, and they caused a proclamation to pass throughout the camp; whilst there it is written, Then shalt thou cause a loud trumpet to pass through [sc. the land]:6 just as there the reference is to the day of the interdict, so here too the day of the interdict [is meant].7 We have thus found [an interdict for] carrying out: whence do we know [that] carrying in [is forbidden]? — That is common sense: consider: it is [transference] from one domain to another: what does it matter whether one carries out or carries in? Nevertheless. carrying out is a primary [labour], [whereas] carrying in is a derivative.
Yet let us consider: one is culpable for both: why is one designated a principal and the other a derivative [labour]? — The practical difference is that if one performs two principal or two derivative [labours] together he is liable to two [sacrifices], whereas if he performs a principal [labour] and its derivative he is liable only to one. But according to R. Eliezer, who imposes liability for a derivative [when performed] conjointly with8 the principal, why is one called a principal and the other a derivative? — That which was of account in the Tabernacle is designated a principal, whereas that which was not of account in the Tabernacle is designated a derivative.9 Alternatively, that which is written is designated a principal, whereas that which is not written is designated a derivative.
Again, as to what we learnt, 'If one throws [an article] four cubits on to a wall above ten handbreadths, it is as though he throws it into the air;10 if below ten, it is as though he throws it on to the ground;11 and he who throws [an article] four cubits along the ground is culpable',12 — how do we know that he who throws [an article] four cubits in the street is culpable? — Said R. Josiah: Because the curtain weavers threw their needles to each other.13 Of what use are needles to weavers? — Rather [say:] Because the sewers threw their needles to each other. But perhaps they sat close together? — Then they would reach each other with their needles.14 Yet perhaps they sat within four [cubits] of each other? Rather said R. Hisda: Because the curtain weavers threw the clue into the curtain. But the other [worker] still has the distaff in his hand? — He refers to the last manipulation.15 But it passed through a place of non-liability?16 — Rather [say:] Because the curtain weavers threw the clue to those who would borrow it from them.17 Yet perhaps they sat near each other? Then they would touch each other on making the border. Yet perhaps they sat in irregular lines?18 Moreover, did they borrow from each other? Surely Luda19 taught: every man from his work which they wrouqht:20 he wrought of his own work [stuff], but not of his neighbour's.21 Again, how do we know that if one carries [an article] four cubits in the street, he is culpable? Rather the whole [law of transporting] four cubits in the street is known by tradition.
Rab Judah said in Samuel's name: [The offence of] the gatherer [of sticks]22 was that he carried [them] four cubits over public ground. In a Baraitha it was taught: He cut [them] off.23 R. Aha b. Jacob said: He tied [them] together.24 In respect of what is the practical difference? — In respect of Rab's [dictum]. For Rab said, I found a secret scroll of the School of R. Hiyya, wherein It is written, Issi b. Judah said: There are thirty-nine principal labours, but one is liable only [for] one. One and no more? Surely we learnt, The principal labours are forty less one. And we pondered thereon: why state the number? And R. Johanan answered: [To teach] that if one performs all of then, in one state of unawareness, he is liable for each separately? Say: for one of these he is not culpable.25 Now, Rab Judah is certain that he who carries [in the street] is culpable; the Baraitha is certain that he who cuts off is culpable; while R. Aha b. Jacob is certain that lie who binds is culpable. [Thus] one Master holds, This at least is not in doubt, while the other Master holds, That at least is not in doubt.26
Our Rabbis taught: The gatherer was Zelophehad. And thus it is said, and while the children of Israel were in the wilderness, they found a man [gathering sticks, etc.];27 whilst elsewhere it is said, our father died in the wilderness;28 just as there Zelophehad [is meant], so here too Zelophehad [is meant]: this is R. Akiba's view. Said R. Judah b. Bathyra to him, 'Akiba! in either case you will have to give an account [for your statement]: if you are right,29 the Torah shielded30 him, while you reveal him; and if not, you cast a stigma upon a righteous man.'
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